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Beyond the Grave - The Use and Meaning of 
Human Body Parts: A Historical Introduction 
Susan C. Lawrence 
In a recent essay on the use of body parts from newly dead human beings for 
organ transplants and medical research, Ruth Chadwick concludes that "ratio- 
nal ethical arguments have failed to hold sway in thinking about the dead [as 
exploitable objects] because of possible strong intuitions about the respect due 
to the corpse. It has been accepted, however, that the corpse has importance 
as a symbol, and that foetal remains and particular parts of the body have 
especially strong symbolism which cannot be ignored." l Chadwick appeals, 
throughout her article, to vague references from the past to support her point 
that corpses were "symbols" of the living human being and that this "syrn- 
bolic" presence explains the common "intuition" that the dead - like the liv- 
ing - deserve respect. She assumes, like many other contemporary writers, 
that she need not justify that the living deserve respect, nor that more might 
be said about just what it is - and was - that corpses and their parts sym- 
bolize. While Chadwick's philosophical reflections primarily concern organs, 
and not entire bodies or small tissue samples, her approach to the meaning 
of human body parts is typical in that it rests upon a set of relatively recent 
values primarily expressed in secular Western cultures. Certainly Chadwick 
is quite right to stress that symbolic meanings must be understood in order 
to ground an ethical position on the appropriate use of human materials; 
what is not clear from her comment, however, is just how much those sym- 
bolic meanings have varied over time and place and how much they stdl 
vary among people from diverse political, economic, intellectual, and religious 
backgrounds within Western societies. 
In this essay I outline the wide range of ways that human beings have used 
body parts in the past, primarily within Anglo-American cultural frameworks 
and experiences. I concentrate on practices much more than on the formation 
of theories (e.g., development of abstract legal perspectives or philosophical 
analyses of the "body") or the expression of particular ethical principles (e.g., 
should body parts be used? should medical researchers be allowed to use tissue 
samples stored from days before informed consent?). A focus on historical ac- 
tions, including suggestive comments on how these actions made sense at par- 
ticular times and places, offers us a way to look at the harmonies and tensions 
between expressed values and cultural  practice^.^ At a time when taking, stor- 
ing, and using human tissues for a variety of purposes seems to have become 
a common practice in Western biomedicine with little advance discussion 
about their status in law or contemporary ethics, a historical perspective can 
sharply remind us that practices always express cultural values (whether overt 
or hidden) and that cultural values vary considerably among different popu- 
lations, even within a single overarching group defined by religious or political 
boundaries, be they medieval Europeans or twentieth-century Americans. To 
create useful, fair, and sensitive ethical guidelines for future use of human ma- 
terials requires that we take the diversity of beliefs and practices of a pluralistic 
society into account. 
Because this essay offers a very broad historical survey, I do no more than 
raise significant connections between beliefs and practice, introduce a few gen- 
eral themes, and refine the way that we ask questions about the "ownership" 
and "use" of human parts (skeletons, organs, blood, or tissues). I have two 
overarching points to make. First, beliefs about the location of humanness and 
personal identity - in the body, the brain, the soul, or combinations of these 
"places" - shape the meaning and value that humans ascribe to body parts. 
Hearts, blood, brains, and eyes, for instance, have long seemed more power- 
ful, more central to personhood, or more attuned to spiritual connections 
than hair, saliva, leg muscles, or kidneys. Hence generalizations about "human 
parts" whether in historical research or in ethical guidelines will founder un- 
less we recognize that different religious and cultural groups ascribe different 
hierarchies of values to body parts and that these change over time. In the same 
vein, I claim that the ways in which humans have used body parts at any 
particular time and place depended directly on the meaning (status, power, 
value, etc.) attached to the human being from whom they came. The corpses 
of saints and the corpses of criminals in the medieval period had widely differ- 
ing meanings, despite their apparent similarity as dead human beings. These 
meanings - whether taken literally or understood as symbolic of "higher" 
ideas - allowed pieces of the former to be venerated and pieces of the later to 
be reviled and "punished." 
Second, I emphasize that the principles of "autonomy" and "informed con- 
sent," which have emerged specifically in twentieth-century Western cultures 
shaped by beliefs in democratic government, a service-capitalism economy, 
and secularly defined law and moral codes, have started to transform practices 
previously imbued with religious beliefs about life after death and/or specific 
social rituals that demonstrated "respect" for dead bodies and their parts. Per- 
forming specific rituals over the dead, be these for "proper" burial, entomb- 
ment, or cremation, has long been held, indeed, to be one of the central char- 
acteristics distinguishing the "truly human" from the animal.3 Disposing of 
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the corpses of other people as if they were unwanted animal carcasses has been 
a ubiquitous way of identifying certain individuals or entire peoples as un- 
worthy of respect, from the suicide hung at the crossroads in early modern 
Europe to the mass graves of attempted genocides. From this perspective, I 
suggest that part of the ongoing revulsion, or at least ambivalence, that many 
people feel about using parts of human bodies (if not other people's, at least 
their for medical or scientific purposes comes from deep cultural beliefs 
that proper disposal of the dead means laying the body to "rest" - literally in 
burial, symbolically in cremation - with all the deceased's parts and organs 
together. Putting the values of autonomy and informed consent into practice, 
of course, demands that kin, ministers, physicians, and hospital administra- 
tors (among many others) all respect the decisions of an individual about what 
happens to his or her cells, tissues, organs, and entire body during life and 
after death. Understanding and respecting why people refuse to donate parts 
of themselves for others to use is just as important (although "irrational" to 
some) as accepting why other people do so willingly. Until all of the living 
believe that use of their own and their loved ones' body parts in therapeutics, 
teaching, and research actually demonstrates appropriate "respect" for the in- 
dividual dead person, the tension between those who want parts for these pur- 
poses and those who refuse to give them will persist. 
These points clearly make sense for human materials (entire corpses, sig- 
nificant organs) that obviously embody a sense of human identity and person- 
hood, parts that individuals should be able to have disposed of in ways that 
are meaningful to them. Tissue samples (bits of organs taken for biopsy, a few 
vials of blood, small sections stored in pathology labs for histological exami- 
nation), in contrast, appear too small to matter. Like the hair, saliva, and skin 
cells that we shed every day, it seems almost absurd to worry about a "proper," 
respectful laying to rest of such scraps. Yet, as other essays in this volume em- 
phasize in several different ways, even tiny pieces of individual people have 
taken on new meanings and new values over the past decade. The abstract 
knowledge that nearly all of our cells contain our own unique versions of DNA 
now has concrete implications for personal identity. Laboratory techniques 
can produce individualized DNA profiles in a matter of hours from either 
fresh or stored tissue samples. Serious issues of privacy for the living and the 
dead and of profit for genetic researchers are but two of the areas where the 
recent developments in science will quite literally reshape human attitude to- 
ward their own cells. Just as Western societies have witnessed transformations 
in beliefs about the use and meaning of entire corpses and the use of the viable 
organs of the newly dead, so too will we experience a cultural shift - and 
cultural conflicts - in attitudes toward minute parts. Whether these will be 
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resolved by procedures for informed consent and adherence to the values of 
personal autonomy remains to be seen. 
In this essay, I range over many centuries and touch on a wide variety of 
"uses" for human body parts. I do so in order to juxtapose practices and de- 
bates that I have not yet seen considered together. It has seemed as though the 
uses of body parts in religious worship, in criminal law, in medical treatments, 
in medical education, and in anthropological research have all been primarily 
considered within each discrete and isolated field. Each area of life or thought 
defines the "body" in different ways; these ways in turn justify the exemption 
of parts from burial (or reburial) and allow pieces to be put in storage or on 
display. Because such attitudes can diverge widely from each other and yet 
somehow co-exist in the same legal and moral universe, even as that universe 
changes over time, their comparison offers us possible insights into current 
areas of conflict and compromise. 
I organize my discussion around the basic areas of human experience that 
have dominated beliefs about human body parts and the uses to which they 
have been put. While the discussion is roughly in chronological order, I must 
stress that all of these areas are at work at all times, either implicitly or explic- 
itly. These are religion, political/legal, and medical. I close with my view of 
the specific ways in which a historical perspective contributes to the meaning 
and treatment of stored tissue samples. 
Religion: The Sacred and the Profane 
I begin with religion because so much of the literature concerning dead 
human bodies emphasizes the very basic social practice of the proper disposal 
of the dead for religious reasons. These reasons have sometimes been explicitly 
theological: correct burial, entombment, or cremation of the dead body is nec- 
essary for the existence and happiness of the person in the next life, either 
right after death or at some point in the future. Whether involving a literal 
concept of bodily resurrection (as in certain strands within Christianity) or a 
symbolic one sensitive to a "natural" integrity of the decaying corpse, such 
religious beliefs create strong and important rituals around the disposal of the 
dead body. These rituals, moreover, often serve to protect the living from the 
anger or revenge of the newly dead and hence incorporate the power of fear 
of the corpse as well as love and respect for the dead person. 
Even when religious dogma places less emphasis on the intact presence of 
the corpse for a period after death (as with cremation), social rituals developed 
through both religious and more broadly cultural beliefs have almost univer- 
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sally stressed that certain acts display appropriate respect for the dead.5 The 
nearly ubiquitous notion of the importance of showing "respect" for the hu- 
man corpse has its roots deep in religious traditions, no matter how secular- 
ized this "respect" became in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Western so- 
~ieties.~ In turn, mutilation of the dead body, delayed burial, disinterment, 
and inept treatment of the corpse during embalming, the funeral service, and 
burial have all been interpreted as marks of "disrespect" that nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century Anglo-American courts have judged to be liable as torts 
in common law. Close relatives who suffer emotional distress from such acts 
have thus won damages, whether or not they explicitly appealed to violations 
of religious beliefs. 
Within the Judeo-Christian tradition, the dead body and its disposal ac- 
quired intense religious meaning. The ancient Hebrews, in practices that con- 
tinue in orthodox Judaism, insisted upon the immediate burial of their dead 
and a ritualized period of mourning for the family and community. The con- 
tinuing concerns about the "uncleanliness" of the corpse and desecration of 
the body by cutting into it - "mutilation" - have shaped a long tradition 
of resistance to autopsies and the dissection of Jews for teaching  purpose^.^ 
Christianity, in its emergence from Judaism in the context of Greco-Roman 
culture, developed a much more complex theological relationship to the dead. 
In part, the rejection of Jewish laws and customs helped early Christians to 
distinguish themselves from the older religion, and denying the innate "un- 
cleanliness" of the corpse was part of this larger trend. That Roman law simi- 
larly held the corpse to be offensive, requiring burial outside the city, for 
instance, and absolutely forbidding the violation of buried or entombed re- 
mains, similarly demarcated Christianity from the dominant pagan c u l t ~ r e . ~  
Yet the crucial significance of the physical and spiritual resurrection of 
Christ meant that Christians also needed to deal more particularly with the 
meaning of the dead body both at the time of death and for its resurrection at 
the Last Judgment. Caroline Walker Bynum has explored, in sophisticated de- 
tail, the conflicting perspectives among Christians from the church fathers of 
the third century to the theologians at the start of the fourteenth century on 
just how resurrection was supposed to occur. Much of the theological and 
liturgical discussion among church elites centered on the importance of the 
material resurrection of the body as vital for the continuance of the individual. 
Even with a separate soul constituting a distinctly immaterial spiritual self, the 
full self, these men argued, emerged with the individual personhood of lived 
experience in particular flesh. Thus, the debates on the self in the afterlife (did 
a person continue to have a gender? an age? physical evidence of valued mar- 
tyrdom?), even when "perfect" (which meant?) with God, constantly dealt 
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with the problem of the apparent physical decay of the corpse and its eventual 
role in defining the self after death. Some sort of bodily resurrection, in short, 
was profoundly necessary for medieval thinkers, at the same time that it raised 
considerable anxiety about the burial of the whole body. It was a considerable 
comfort for some, for example, to believe that a person would be reunited 
with an amputated limb when made perfect at Judgment, just as other dam- 
aged parts would be made whole and well again for eternal happine~s.~ 
Such arguments for the material resurrection of the body as it was in life 
(not, of course, as a decayed corpse),1° however, had a tense relationship with 
another practice developed within medieval Christianity: the importance and 
power of saints' relics.ll Holy relics included pieces of the true cross and ob- 
jects, like clothing, that saints had used in life; they also included body parts, 
primarily bones, blood, and hair, but also sometimes organs and completely 
mummified corpses. One argument made at the time, of course, was that such 
pieces - particularly necessary parts like bones and organs - would be re- 
united with the saint at Judgment, but that in the meantime the saint had a 
perfect body in heaven. At the same time, however, relics of bone and flesh 
were quite literally part of the saint and still invested with her or his spiritual 
power. They were not mere symbols, then, but active spiritual material, exist- 
ing, as Christ had, in at least two places at once. Relics, moreover, could be 
further divided over time and thus distribute a particular saint's presence and 
benefits to more people.12 
The crucial difference between the ostensibly horrifying practice of cutting 
up the bodies of holy people soon after death, or the at least unsavorywilling- 
ness to disinter bodies and distribute what was left of the remains (usually 
bones, but sometime mummified flesh), and such acts on the body of a com- 
mon sinner rested in the purpose of the dismemberment and the subsequent 
veneration of the parts.13 Laid in appropriate reliquaries, some of which were 
complex works of art, the saint's body parts in some sense were more than 
respected: they were venerated and adored.14 Of course, Catholic priests and 
theologians were extremely careful not to permit idol worship. The remains 
themselves were not literally divine. Instead, the presence of part of the saint's 
body allowed the worshiper to concentrate on the lessons of the saint's life - 
even if just holiness in general - and to find a path to the saint, who was alive 
in heaven, for intercession with God. The presence of relics was clearly not 
necessary for miracles to occur, yet their proximity acted rather like a catalyst. 
By simply existing they encouraged people to take pilgrimages to visit them, 
to fear them if not properly revered, and to credit their presence with healing 
powers. l5 
As sacred and powerful objects, relics became important adjuncts to the 
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founding of new churches and monasteries during the European expansion of 
Catholicism in the fourth to fourteenth centuries. They also became items of 
exchange, pieces "gifted" for favors, for prestige, and for political and reli- 
gious influence, as well as more crudely marketed commodities.16 Indeed, the 
proliferation of relics, especially the increasing number of forged ones, raised 
the ire of Catholic reformers throughout the later Middle Ages.17 Sixteenth- 
century Protestant reformers, in turn, not only criticized the undoubted 
reverence for false relics, but quickly denied the canonization of saints and 
abolished the veneration of human remains as outright idolatry. The con- 
cern over the authenticity of holy parts and objects led, during the Counter- 
Reformation, to the pope's creation of the "Sacred Congregation for Indul- 
gences and Relics." l8 True relics continue to have an important place within 
twentieth-century Catholicism, although it is far more difficult to have new 
ones accepted by the church. The use and treatment of relics are closely regu- 
lated by canon law, which states, for example, that selling relics is simony and 
hence forbidden.19 If there is still a cash market for relics, it is either under- 
ground or based upon the material, artistic, or historic value of the reliquary, 
not upon its spiritual power. Stories told about pious priests and monks cast- 
ing out the bones of ordinary people when they were discovered to be forg- 
eries, Protestants destroying previously saintly relics, and French revolution- 
aries smashing the Catholics' sacred remains, moreover, attest to the ways in 
which lack of respect for these human fragments had potent religious and po- 
litical meaning20 
Law: Property and Torts 
Just as parts of the saintly body were long venerated in Western culture, so 
were the bodies, and parts of bodies, of dying heretics and criminals burnt, 
dismembered, hung to rot, or crudely buried outside of consecrated ground 
in order to continue their punishments into the next life. All of these marks 
of excommunication and infamy, moreover, served secular powers (for the 
church technically could not execute people) throughout the medieval and 
early modern periods as ways to terrorize potential ~rongdoers.~' While all 
Protestant denominations rejected the adoration of saints' relics, most Prot- 
estant sects and Protestant rulers continued to include public execution and 
public humiliation of the corpse as important elements of punishment for the 
most heinous criminals, especially murderers, until the eighteenth or, in some 
instances, the nineteenth centuries. "Respect" and "decent" burial, in short, 
were only for "respectable" and "decent" people. 
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The association of mutilation of the corpse with postmortem penalties for 
murderers offered the earliest rationale for the official use of dead bodies in 
medicine for nontherapeutic purposes. From at least the early fourteenth cen- 
tury, evidence exists that academic physicians had begun to supervise public 
dissections of human cadavers. Starting in Italy, at the University of Bologna, 
it appears that secular rulers granted a few corpses of executed criminals to be 
cut up to demonstrate the parts of the body in association with readings from 
standard texts. Elite physicians, assisted by local surgeons, held these "anato- 
mies" perhaps two or three times a year.22 By the early modern period, it is 
clear that in some cities the "anatomies" were open to nonmedical people who 
found edification in seeing the inside of a human being accompanied by a 
learned account of God's handiwork.23 Such audiences also felt satisfaction in 
observing the last visible rendering of justice upon the criminal.24 Whether or 
not people believed in the literal resurrection of the body, the murderer - 
who was already excommunicate in Catholic jurisdictions - suffered symbol- 
ically. Secular rulers also intended that the final indignity of dissection, and 
then burial (if at all) in unconsecrated ground, would deter would-be felons 
from the crime. By the mid-eighteenth century in England, the state further 
linked the penalty for premeditated murder with anatomical dissection by 
surgeons for the pedagogic benefit of practitioners and apprentices. The 1752 
Murder Act replaced the judge's discretion to add dissection to the sentence 
of death with the requirement that the corpses of murderers in London were 
to be cut up at Surgeons' Hall.25 
The official connection between dissection and punishment for murder 
carried significant political and cultural meaning in the following decades. 
Between the 1740s and 1800 medical education expanded in London, as it 
did in other major cities, and getting a good medical training increasingly 
required that all students actually dissect a human body with their own hands 
instead of simply watching a dissection with a large crowd of pupils. Sur- 
geons' apprentices and other students soon found that the official anato- 
mies of murderers were insufficient and turned to corpses "resurrected" from 
graveyards for needed material. By the late eighteenth century "professional" 
body-snatchers - who were not medical students or anatomists - had be- 
gun a profitable business supplying dissecting rooms with material. It is highly 
likely that such body-snatching had gone on discreetly for centuries; but by 
the early nineteenth century the demand for cadavers had increased to the 
point where laypeople could no longer tolerate the violation of cemeteries and 
the commodification of the dead. Disgust at the practice intensified, as Ruth 
Richardson amply describes, because body-snatchers took the dead from re- 
spectable graves instead of just "using" the bodies of the very poor. This shift 
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led, after convoluted political turns, to the Anatomy Act of 1832.~~ This act 
became the standard model for anatomy acts passed in Canada, Australia, and 
other British territories, as well as in various states in America from the mid- 
1830s to the 1920s. 
The provisions of the Anatomy Act of 1832, to which I return below, 
stemmed not only from a major shift in ideas about appropriate medical 
training, but also from the status of the corpse in law and contemporary regu- 
lation of burials. Laws governing appropriate burial, including, for instance, 
the requirement to provide a reasonable interment for any stranger dying in 
one's house when no relatives could be found, had emerged in both church 
law and common law by the early modern period. An equally complex body 
of law developed around the proper disposal of corpses during times of famine 
and epidemics, when the secular powers of city, parish, or state needed to en- 
sure burial, and sometimes even cremation, for those whose relatives could 
not manage it. Such provisions led, in turn, to laws regulating burial for rea- 
sons of "public health," a discipline that with hindsight may be seen develop- 
ing in medieval cities, but which is clearly articulated only early in the nine- 
teenth century.27 
A central question in Anglo-American law, and of considerable import for 
the political implications of the use of parts of dead human bodies, is the 
extent to which a property relationship can exist between the living and the 
corpse. The hallowed traditions of English common law state that there can 
be, in fact, no ownership of a dead human body at all. What has evolved, 
instead, are definitions of "legal possession" of the body. Those who own the 
property where a person dies have proper "possession" until someone with a 
greater claim arrives to take possession of the corpse for burial. Such a claim, 
in turn, rests upon the responsibility of kin to ensure that the body is decently 
interred, and the order of duty follows degrees of relationship: from spouse, 
to adult children, to parents, and so on through near kin back to the owner of 
the property where the person died.28 
The origins of the principle that "there can be no property in a dead corpse" 
are, as many English legal texts complain, quite obscure. Indeed, according to 
the best historical and legal analysis I have seen to date, this precept emerged 
from a series of errors in understanding early modern jurists and in interpret- 
ing fragments of reports of seventeenth-century cases. As Paul Matthews ex- 
plains, however, once the principle (even if incorrectly based) became en- 
shrined in common law, it became the common law and was so treated by 
judges from the eighteenth century This point is extremely significant, 
for it means that in Britain the corpse itself and its parts have no standing 
under the law for damage, theft, exchange, or inheri tan~e.~~ None of the ways 
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in which property is defined, managed, or transferred in either criminal or 
civil law can apply directly to the dead body. Mutilation of a dead body, inap- 
propriate disinterment, and the like must thus be handled under laws specifi- 
cally about the corpse. Because it is not property, the body cannot be willed 
by its owner, although the kin can of course try to fidfill the deceased's (lawful) 
wishes. Before the Anatomy Act of 1832, therefore, a person could not be prose- 
cuted for "stealing" a dead body, either before or after burial, because it was 
not theft; someone caught with a "resurrected" corpse could only be charged 
with the theft of the shroud or winding sheets or the coffin, if that was also 
taken too. These were the property of those who provided them or, failing 
that, of the next of kin. This interesting situation meant that those tried for 
body-snatching usually faced only a misdemeanor (due to the small value of 
winding sheets and shrouds), instead of a felony, which at this period was pun- 
ishable by death. 
In the United States, as writers on the law have discussed in detail, the 
corpse is usually considered "quasi-property." It is not true property, a point 
of view inherited from English common law, yet it has some of the elements 
of a property relationship with the living. In effect, "quasi-property" means 
that, just as in the case of right and duty of possession in England, kin (or legal 
alternates) have the privilege and responsibility to see that the dead relative is 
disposed of properly. As in English law, a hierarchy of relationship degrees lays 
out the order of precedence in making the funeral and burial  decision^.^^ In 
both English and American law, moreover, the requirements of public health 
and the public interest in the apprehension of criminals give authority to vari- 
ous branches of government to interfere with the kin's plans for burial or cre- 
mation. Public health concerns might dictate further medical investigation or 
immediate cremation of a "dangerous" corpse; the police and the court system 
can order autopsies, and the storage of a dead person, to satisfy the needs of 
investigation and justice. Samples of the corpse's body fluids, organs, and tis- 
sues can then be kept after the dead body is released for burial for as long as 
needed by the prosecution and defense to run tests. 
This body of law, in England and America, nicely deals with the death and 
final disposal of most people. When conflicts and complaints about the treat- 
ment of the corpse arise, many problems end up in civil, rather than criminal, 
courts. While a hospital, government agency, undertaker, or burial manager 
cannot be sued for damage to "property" if someone feels that the body of his 
or her relative has been abused, the offended kin may sue for wrongs done to 
the feelings, dignity, respect, or status of the surviving (and presumed loving) 
relations. Much case law in both nations exists on this process, and U.S. courts 
have heard claims for damages for the distress caused by, among other things, 
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mutilation by unauthorized autopsy, mutilation by unauthorized dissection, 
negligence in gathering up the body parts of someone killed by a train, im- 
proper embalming, use of a too-small coffin, and fraud in returning ashes 
from a group cremation instead of from individual cremations, as the com- 
pany promised. In all of these cases, the relatives had to convince the court that 
the mistreatment had severely disturbed them, occasioning emotional pain by 
the lack of proper respect shown for the remains of those close to them. While 
relatives can be distressed by such wrongs, moreover, the way that these ac- 
tions work means that strangers cannot sue on the same grounds. The courts 
have decided, at least so far, that without a close relationship with the de- 
ceased during life a person, even the executor of the estate, cannot be dis- 
tressed enough to bring a valid claim for damages.32 
Combining the principle that there is "no property in a body" (or that the 
corpse is only "quasi-property") with the duty of the householder (or equiva- 
lent) to dispose of the body of an unclaimed person dying on his or her prop- 
erty and with the case law that denied "strangers" the grounds to sue for mal- 
treatment of a corpse gives the underlying mind-set not only for the cultural 
and political formation of the British Anatomy Act of 1832, but also for sub- 
sequent Anglo-American legislation on unclaimed corpses. In brief, the act 
allowed the overseers of the poor, parish offices, masters of workhouses, hos- 
pital administrators, and magistrates to provide the bodies of those who died 
in their care (or who died on the street or in some other public place) to 
licensed anatomists working at licensed medical schools, provided that the in- 
dividual had not explicitly stated that he or she did not want to be dissected or 
that the relatives of the deceased objected. In effect, the act meant that a poor 
person dying with no relatives at hand to object could be dissected if the offi- 
cial with "legal possession" of the body (i.e., those in positions listed above) 
so decided. At this point, hired undertakers moved the corpse to a medical 
school, where the anatomist took "legal possession" of the cadaver. In 1832 the 
act specified that the anatomist could have the body for eight weeks, at which 
time the law required that all the remains be buried "decently." 33 
As Ruth Richardson has stressed, this legislation embodies not only impor- 
tant elements of political maneuvering by the classes with power and wealth 
to protect their own graves, but also a continued association of dissection with 
punishment, in this case punishment for dying while dependent on the state 
or charity (via poor rates, workhouses, hospitals) for The act did 
manage, however, at least to express upper-class sensibilities about the final 
disposal of even the very poor and abandoned in proper graves and their con- 
cern that bodies, even if in fragments, be interred with all of their parts. Under 
the powers invested in the newly created "Inspectorate of Anatomy," the gov- 
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ernment's officers supervised the act, which eventually supplied an adequate 
number of cadavers for medical schools' demands. 
The Anatomy Act in Britain was modified slightly in 1872, and reworked in 
1984, but the basic status of the corpse in law and the primary responsibility 
and rights of kin to dispose of the dead have not changed.35 Similarly, when 
the commonwealth nations and states of the United States adopted the British 
Anatomy Act, each legislative body modified it to suit local conditions and 
jurisdictions, but kept the essential idea - the use of state-dependent, "un- 
claimed" bodies for anatomy teaching in medical schools - intact.36 Until 
World War I1 - for reasons as yet not clearly understood - the part of the 
act allowing the explicit donation of one's own body after death for dissection 
was very rarely invoked; by 1951 voluntary bequests had only reached 40 per- 
cent of the annual supply for dissection, climbing to between 70 and loo per- 
cent in the 1960s and the 1970s.~~ In most areas in the United Kingdom and the 
United States today, donations of bodies (many expressed well before death) 
to medical schools fill the educational demand; in the United Kingdom, how- 
ever, the old law is still on the books and is occasionally applied to the bodies 
of the unclaimed dead. 
In a very important sense, as this discussion has shown, the law actually has 
had very little to say about human body parts other than for anatomical dissec- 
tion or proper burial before the development of organ transplants and com- 
plex biochemical and genetic studies. Legislation passed between the 1960s and 
1980s in Britain and the United States (e.g., the 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift 
Act) has more or less dealt with the issues and procedures involved in organ 
transplants, particularly in declaring that human body parts for transplanta- 
tion cannot be knowingly exchanged "for valuable consideration." 38 Yet there 
was, and still is, a large shadowy area where medical practitioners and scien- 
tists take, keep, and use "worthless" bits of human bodies without questions 
of law, "respect," or responsibility crossing their minds. The various "ana- 
tomical" and "tissue" acts governing dissection and organ transplants have 
major loopholes, in fact, when it comes to the disposition of human material 
not for therapeutic purposes, but for medical and scientific research. The 1987 
amended Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (which most states have adopted in 
some form or other), for example, prohibits the sale of organs and tissues 
for transplant, but not - by obvious omission - for use in teaching and re- 
search.39 This is the case, I believe, in part because researchers have taken "use- 
less" human material for centuries without the practice being seen as prob- 
lematic by people or groups with both significant political power and moral 
objections. In the past twenty years, however, the constant expansion of clini- 
cal research requiring blood and tissue samples and the exponential growth in 
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the amount of personal information that can be recovered from body parts 
mean that issues of lawful possession, respectful disposal, informed consent, 
and biological privacy have taken on new force and new urgency.40 
Science and Medicine: Body Parts and Artifacts 
The first use of human body parts for what we could reasonably call "medi- 
cine" in Western culture appears in therapeutics. Heinrich von Staden has 
observed (following Mary Douglas' important insights in her Purity and Dan- 
ger) that the early Greeks, from whom we have a fairly large number of well- 
studied texts, used "impure," "polluted," "dirty," or similarly despised ma- 
terials for therapeutic ends. The underlying rationale was simple: in certain 
diseases, conditions, or individual cases, the disorder-causing problem needed 
to be "drawn out" or (in a modern metaphor) neutralized, by the most potent 
of substances. The worst, most unsavory, "dangerous," and forbidden things 
had considerable power and hence, if applied carefully, could cure. Among 
the unsavory and forbidden substances were various kinds of animal feces, 
poisonous plants, and, in certain contexts, human blood, tissues, and bones. 
The use of human material was rare, but it persisted. Von Staden reports, for 
example, that a Greek physician, Artemon, prescribed drinking spring water 
"from a murdered person's skull" for epilepsy. Almost two thousand years 
later, seventeenth-century European pharmacopoeias contained remedies that 
required "mummy" - the dried remains of human bodies.41 
Such beliefs might seem to be no more than odd stories from quasi-magical 
folk traditions, except that they reveal the way in which credible medical prac- 
titioners can essentially redefine certain body parts. Laying "therapeutic" over 
"offensive" or "disgusting" shifts the moral category of using human parts 
from intolerable to permissible. In Western societies, the continuation of the 
taboos against using parts of dead (and living) human beings as food or fertil- 
izer fails to shift the moral category of this material from intolerable to permis- 
sible, despite logical arguments about the possible utility of such practices.42 
Similarly, using parts of dead bodies to make artistic works (outside of certain 
historical curiosities) has been taken as inappropriate, if not totally offensive.43 
Hence the therapeutic use of human substances, from blood transfusions to 
the implantation of fetal brain cells into people with Parlunson's disease, is 
and d l  continue to be controversial precisely because medicine's power to 
redefine the meaning of human parts requires much more than rational ar- 
guments about beneficial outcomes. It requires, I suggest, a certain coherence, 
or compatibility, between the kind of body part employed, the proposed pur- 
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pose, and the broader, often emotional, value of the body part - or the dead 
body as a whole - to the living. 
The appeal to therapeutic benefit, nevertheless, is currently the most con- 
vincing way to make the use of human substances acceptable. The appeal to 
"science" is much more fraught with ambiguities. An argument for educa- 
tional necessity - as with the "need" for human cadavers for medical stu- 
dents - falls somewhere in the middle, as certain practices, such as dissec- 
tion, have been justified by the presumed therapeutic benefit of well-trained 
practitioners. In the following discussion, I concentrate on the use of human 
body parts for "science," without explicit analysis of the development of rea- 
sons for use in teaching, primarily because the rhetoric of formal medical 
education and training has always included the necessity of educating neo- 
phytes in the medical "sciences," whatever those have been at different times 
and places.44 
Anatomy was, of course, the first "science" that needed human body parts 
for study, although much of the early work that the Greeks, and then Greco- 
Romans, did on the structures of bodies was done on animals considered 
analogous to humans.45 Physiology - knowledge of how the body func- 
tioned - depended in part on descriptions of body parts, but, until the eigh- 
teenth and nineteenth centuries, was shaped around what moderns tend to 
see as "merely" philosophical constructs, particularly the system of the four 
humors and three (or more) basic "souls" or well-springs of action, such as 
digestionlnutrition and the motions of muscles. As noted in the section on 
law above, the study of human gross anatomy changed in the fourteenth cen- 
tury, with the occasional demonstration of the interior parts of the body on 
the corpses of criminals. But it is important to stress here that until the "sol- 
ids" (organs, etc.) were seen as significant locations of normal and pathologi- 
cal processes for which some therapy could be devised most practitioners con- 
sidered that intensive attention to the details of human structure was nearly 
irrelevant to clinical practice. The academic study of anatomy for elite practi- 
tioners expanded in sixteenth-century Italy, as the notable example of Vesa- 
lius' monumental On the Fabric of the Human Body (1543) attests.46 
Thus, during the centuries in which Europeans most actively gathered and 
partitioned the physical remains of holy people, medical practitioners actually 
had relatively little interest in dissecting, describing, and mapping human re- 
mains for the sake of "kn~wledge."~~ The former was sacred; the latter pro- 
fane. At the same time, however, men of the law became interested in seeking 
the marks of crime - especially poison and dead wounds - within the bod- 
ies of those (usually important people) who died unexpectedly. The need to 
understand the evidence produced with forensic autopsies, in fact, may well 
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have been one of the key reasons why demonstrative human dissection began 
at the University of Bologna, a major center for the study of law in the thir- 
teenth and fourteenth centuries.48 Medical men, for both legal and, increas- 
ingly, medically diagnostic reasons, performed postmortem investigations of 
the body's interior over the next centuries, but many of these were focused on 
answering specific questions about the cause(s) of death, and they were rarely 
open explorations into pathological anatomy before the eighteenth and nine- 
teenth centuries. Autopsies were more acceptable to people than is generally 
assumed, primarily because the procedure could be restricted to certain areas 
of the body (e.g., excluding the head) and were always restricted in time. A 
postmortem physical examination might take a few hours, but after that the 
usual arrangements for the funeral and burial continued. The corpse, then, 
while disfigured by the operation, was (supposedly) interred with all of its 
parts and with appropriate "respect" and "decency." Certainly relatives and 
friends objected to autopsies, and usually had their way, until the later devel- 
opment (in the nineteenth century) of the "interests" of the state, superseding 
the interests of kin for evidence in criminal  investigation^.^^ 
More significant than the increasing number of autopsies in the early mod- 
ern period was, I believe, the start of museums that contained specimens of 
human body parts. The historical development of the "museum" itself, from 
private collections to state institutions, has recently received critical academic 
study. In one sense, medieval churches had "collections," as did the courts of 
monarchs and nobles who acquired, and sometimes displayed, various "inter- 
esting" objects. But it was not until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
that collecting and display became a specific goal, with items set into dedicated 
spaces and attention spent on printing catalogs. As Paula Findlen details, the 
beginning of collections of items of "natural history" is particularly intriguing, 
as some collectors tried to gather together material that would present all the 
regularities and curiosities of the natural world.50 Fascination with "odd" 
animals, plants, and rocks had, of course, existed since the Greeks wrote 
texts describing natural phenomena and the Roman author Pliny composed 
his encyclopedic account of all things familiar and strange. During the medi- 
eval and early modern period, however, nature's wonders primarily revealed 
the hand of God, discussed both in sophisticated theological treatises on 
God's creation and in the traditions of hermeneutic, magical, and symbolic 
lore. In both genres, human-produced "monsters" (malformed fetuses and 
newborns) embodied moral and spiritual messages, signaling God's general 
displeasure, the wages of sin, the foolish behavior of the pregnant woman, or 
warnings about hture  catastrophe^.^^ It is not too surprising, then, that some 
of the first anatomical specimens of human parts preserved for display were 
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abnormal fetuses, who hardly counted as "human" at all to their observers. 
They were kept, however, as objects to be studied, not simply as hideous dis- 
plays to be feared and interpreted as portents. The early modern collections of 
natural materials, as Findlen argues, then helped to shift the interest in crea- 
tures, plants, and rocks from the magical and metaphysical to the natural and 
rational is ti^.^^ 
Just when anatomy professors at universities, and surgeons in their guilds, 
started to collect human parts for study and teaching is still obscure. Cer- 
tainly there were articulated skeletons and separate human bones (perhaps 
prepared from dissected criminals) kept for examination by the sixteenth cen- 
tury. Bones, of course, as the longest-lasting parts of the human body, were 
available to be "found" in ways that other parts were not; bones, once dried, 
moreover, did not generally need to have anything else done to preserve them. 
In contrast, it was quite difficult to save any other part of the body unless it 
could be desiccated rapidly in a relatively sterile environment (as the Egyptians 
knew with their embalming methods, and Europeans knew with salting and 
drying). In general, however, keeping specimens of human parts in ways that 
would allow future examination of their structures was not done until a series 
of new techniques for anatomical study and preservation appeared between 
the 1660s and 1680s. Injections of mercury into arteries and veins revealed tiny 
vessel patterns. Injecting liquids that solidified, especially colored waxes, al- 
lowed the tissues to be removed after the liquid hardened, while preserving 
the shape and distributions of the arteries and veins. Even more significant 
was the discovery, in the early 1660s, that parts placed in "spirits" (high-proof 
alcohol) in a sealed glass container would not decompose. Both high-quality 
glass containers and spirits were quite expensive at the time, however, and so 
"potted specimens did not become widespread until the nineteenth century, 
when improvements in glass and spirit manufacture made cheaper containers 
and preservatives possible.53 
These new methods led to a passion for collecting anatomical materials. 
Anatomy collections in Amsterdam, Leyden, Paris, London, Bologna, and 
Padua all became well known by the mid-eighteenth century. In London 
nearly all the successful anatomy teachers created their own sets of materials 
for study and teaching, and these became valuable resources.54 By the mid- 
eighteenth century most surgeon-anatomists deliberately tried to preserve 
specimens of pathological structures, as well as normal anatomy. In the first 
decades of the nineteenth century in the medical schools that developed 
around hospitals, examples of diseased organs and tissues were frequently 
linked to specific case records or autopsy-room log books.55 With the shift 
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to the anatomy of tissues - histology - from the 1840s on, gross anatomical 
specimens made room for collections of slides, which in turn prompted tech- 
niques for preserving slide samples for research and teaching. Anatomy mu- 
seums also housed papier-mlche casts and models made of wood and wax, as 
well as diagrams and  illustration^.^^ 
As this sketch of the basic history of anatomical collections suggests, typical 
historical accounts are remarkably quiet about the source of the human ma- 
terials for specimens. In part this stems from the way that the collectors re- 
corded and labeled their materials. The "objects" were universalized into "the 
bones of the leg" or "a fetus of three months" or "a liver displaying cirrhotic 
change." Such abstractions of the particular nicely fulfilled the needs of teach- 
ers and students, for whom the specimens were supposed to represent "typi- 
cal" human structures, whether "normal," "diseased," or "deformed." 57 Pre- 
sumably some parts came from lawfully dissected criminals, without asking 
the executed person for "donations"; but it is very doubtful that these bodies 
accounted for many of the specimens. "Resurrected" corpses more than likely 
provided the bulk of the organs and sections preserved in eighteenth-century 
England and elsewhere. Specimens from snatched bodies had no provenance, 
perhaps not even names; "consent" to their donation was, by definition, a 
moot point. Under the Anatomy Act of 1832, moreover, the provision for 
complete burial of the dissected person literally meant that in Britain no or- 
gans or sections could be removed for preservation in anatomical collections, 
although enforcing this was problemati~.~~ 
"Interesting" parts from autopsies also ended up in museums, and perhaps 
postmortem inquiries furnished some apparently normal organs for study and 
preservation, especially after the Anatomy Act went into operation. It is nearly 
impossible to know if the relatives who permitted an autopsy also gave per- 
mission for specimens to leave the body. In a few instances in their accounts, 
medical writers noted that the relatives or attendants denied permission to re- 
move organs. They offered such explanations to account for possible errors in 
descriptions that they gave from memory, from notes, and from on-the-spot 
sketches. In others, as suggested by a story that an early nineteenth century 
medical student at St. Thomas' Hospital told his family in a letter, determined 
practitioners performed autopsies even when they knew that permission had 
not been given. With such practices adding excitement to medical life, pre- 
sumably removing a part, such as the heart or stomach, could be easily justi- 
fied and then disguised by adding stuffing, closing the incision, and placing 
the corpse in a 
By the mid-eighteenth century common law principles in England held that 
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no one had property in dead human bodies or parts of dead human bodies. 
But anatomists behaved otherwise. As I have already discussed, there were 
people who removed bodies from graveyards to sell to anatomists in the eigh- 
teenth century, although plenty of "amateurs" (i.e., medical students) did this 
work without payment. Such "trade" ostensibly went on in secret, although it 
is likely that quite a few people were aware of these practices but did not raise 
a fuss when only the bodies of the very poor or unknown were taken.60 It is 
important, then, that a "trade" in preserved body parts went on quite openly 
in the eighteenth century and probably continued into the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Several of the men who lectured on anatomy in London 
and who acquired their own teaching specimens retired or died with quite a 
bit of money tied up in their collections, and these were sometimes put up for 
sale. A few printed catalogs of the auctions for anatomical preparations sur- 
vive and show beyond doubt that human pieces were sold and bought for 
cash.61 After the 1832 Anatomy Act required the burial of all the parts of 
dissected bodies, the inspector of anatomy for London blithely told anatomy 
lecturers to purchase necessary anatomical specimens "from the Continent," 
ironically endorsing an international trade in human body parts because the 
law would not support a local one.62 
In recent law review literature on the status of body parts as property, the 
only lawsuit regularly cited that specifically concerned anatomical specimens 
occurred in Australia in 1908. In Doodeward v. Spence, ultimately considered 
by the High Court of Australia, Mr. Doodeward was a showman who dis- 
played "the preserved corpse of a stillborn child with two heads." Entrepre- 
neurs had put on "freak shows" including deformed animals, living dwarves, 
and "fat ladies" at least since the seventeenth century in Europe, and such 
exhibits had become popular parts of traveling circuses in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.63 Doodeward's stillborn fetus was nothing really new 
at this time, but it offended some local sensibilities, and he was prosecuted for 
"indecent exhibition of the corpse." The police removed the specimen, plac- 
ing it in a university museum; when he demanded its return, they gave him 
only "the bottle and preserving fluid." 
When the three judges of the High Court considered the claims, they di- 
vided over the application of the common law principle that human bodies 
are not property combined with the problem that "lawful possession" was 
usually given to those who wished to bury the body, not to keep it bottled in 
preserving fluid. Hence neither the police department nor the university had 
any claim to the fetus that was better than Doodeward's. The court eventually 
ruled, two to one, that the specimen be returned to Doodeward. One of the 
128 : History, Biomedical Research, Ethics, and Law 
majority decided this on the grounds that the stillborn fetus was not a human 
corpse. The other, Justice Griffin, however, argued that 
when a person has by the lawful exercise of work or skill so dealt with 
a human body or part of a human body in his lawful possession that it 
has acquired some attributes differentiating it from a mere corpse awaiting 
burial, he acquires a right to retain possession of it, as least as against any 
person not entitled to have it delivered to him for the purpose of burial, 
but subject, of course, to any positive law which forbids its retention under 
the particular  circumstance^.^^ 
Until further research uncovers lawsuits that involve treating other (non- 
fetal) anatomical specimens as property, the significance of the Doodeward 
case rests on Griffin's attempt to articulate a criterion that distinguishes ana- 
tomical specimens from other possible uses of parts of dead bodies. As Paul 
Matthews points out, however, this is a weak argument, considering that 
skilled work on other "natural" objects does not make them into the personal 
property of the worker.65 For Matthews, the key argument here is that a person 
who possesses anatomical specimens can only be challenged by "a person with 
a better right to possession." Following this point to its logical conclusion, 
moreover, clearly suggests that a "better right" rests only in people with the 
first right of possession (i.e., the relatives) who intend to dispose of the body 
and its parts.66 
Lastly, anatomical and pathological collections have housed body parts re- 
moved during surgery, which mostly meant amputations before the invention 
of anesthesia in the 1840s and the spread of sterile operating techniques in the 
1870s to 1890s. Very little is known about the history of living patients' reac- 
tions to the storage and display of their parts. A few recent legal cases, however, 
show that some people have in fact attached considerable meaning to the final 
fate of their excised tissue. A case in Dallas in 1975, for example, centered on a 
patient who sued for his intense distress upon learning that his excised eye had 
been lost down a drain; here he claimed damages for negligence, as well as for 
emotional pain.67 In Browing v. Norton- Children's Hospital, in Kentucky in 
1974, a man sought financial solace after the hospital cremated his amputated 
leg because he had a lifelong intense fear of fire and was very upset when 
imagining his leg burning6* As Browing, and others, have discovered, how- 
ever, surgical consent forms generally contain language that gives the hospital 
control over excised tissues for disposal, educational use, or research. Even 
without formal consent, it has been understood that patients in effect "aban- 
don" such materials at the hospital, and so they can hardly ask for them back 
The Use and Meaning of Human Body Parts : 129 
weeks, months, or years later. Since very few patients have intended to keep, 
or to destroy or bury personally, their postsurgical parts, no accommodation 
is made for those who do not express their wishes before the p r ~ c e d u r e . ~ ~  
Concern about the status of excised tissues will only intensify as human 
cells and human genetic material acquire monetary value.70 While the cash 
market for anatomical specimens for medical museums was (and is) rather 
circumscribed, the market for developed cell lines and genes promises a great 
deal more. The case of Maore v. the Regents of the University of California 
(1988-1990) has raised serious issues about who can profit when, in this case, 
the spleen removed from John Moore for treatment of his hairy cell leukemia 
ended up providing his doctors with the primary cells for "a cell line that they 
later patented" with considerable commercial value.71 As discussed above, no- 
tions about having property in the body have been resisted in the case of 
"ownership" over one's body after death; that legal position has made "own- 
ership" in detached parts of one's own living body - as in Moore's case - 
troublesome to define in law, to say the least. As with the dead body, individu- 
als do not "own" their postmortem body parts, but in most jurisdictions they 
have the right to determine the disposition of these parts for burial, cremation, 
or use in transplantation, without "receiving any valuable consideration." 72 
To date, this "gift relationship" has defined the voluntary collection of blood 
for transfusions (except for some "payment for service" fees) and organs for 
transplants in Western nations. In these transactions among the living, both 
the donor (or kin) and donee have agreed to the exchange of blood and organs 
as a service to the injured and the ill, knowing full well that the "material" is, 
in a very important sense, priceless. 
In Moore's case, of course, he did not want possession of his excised tissue 
in order to dispose of it properly; but neither did he understand that he was 
"giving" it to his physician for potentially profitable research. However valu- 
able previous research on postsurgical or postmortem tissues has likely been 
in the past, Moore's case highlights what seemed to be an explicit, direct con- 
nection between an individual's cells and the resultant salable product. In 1990 
the Supreme Court of California overturned the appellate court's decision 
that Moore had a valid claim. The majority arguments basically decided that 
Moore in fact had no ownership or right of possession in his cells once they 
were removed - with his consent - in the hospital; that imposing such own- 
ership on one's own postremoval cells would unduly hinder important medi- 
cal and scientific research; that in Moore's case his cells were not unique, and 
hence use of them did not invade his privacy; and that the patented cell line 
was "both factually and legally distinct" from Moore's original cells.73 The 
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court did agree that Moore's physicians should have told him about their re- 
search interests from the start, and hence they had not fulfilled the spirit of 
fully informed consent when performing the surgery and following his case 
(taking further blood and other samples) over the next several years.74 
In the Supreme Court of California's decision on Moore's suit, Justice Ara- 
bian expressed his deep repulsion that a person (i.e., Moore, not the scientists 
who patented the cell line) could consider "the human vessel - the single 
most venerated and protected subject in any civilized society - as equal with 
the basest commercial commodity." 75 That Arabian identified Moore's cells - 
or even his spleen - as so much a part of the whole "venerated and pro- 
tected" person that turning them into a commodity was as morally objection- 
able as commodifying a living or dead human being ironically speaks volumes 
for a notion of personhood embedded, like a saint's grace, in every speck of 
tissue. Considering the possible biochemical and genetic (hence possibly com- 
mercial) "value" of the vast numbers of identifiable tissue samples from autop- 
sies and operations saved in pathological and anatomical collections, Moore's 
case will not be the last on this problem. Indeed, if Arabian's comment is to 
be taken literally, it already marks the beginning of a major cultural trans- 
formation in Western attitudes toward heretofore "worthless" parts of the self 
and others.76 
Justice Arabian's moral position on Moore's cells is doubly ironic, more- 
over, given the past, and ongoing, treatment of some groups of presumably 
"venerated and protected subject[s] ," as I have already discussed in the use of 
unclaimed paupers' bodies for medical school dissection. When we turn from 
biomedicine to anthropology, and from pathology departments to natural his- 
tory museum displays, human body parts take on yet another set of political 
and cultural meanings. As histories of anthropology, discussions of natural 
history museums, and law review articles on Native American, Aboriginal, and 
other "origin peoples' " burials and remains make abundantly clear, people 
of European descent have systematically dug up, collected, transferred, pre- 
served, and exhibited the remains (usually bones, but also "exotic" shrunken 
heads, human scalps with hair, and mummified connective tissues, for in- 
stance) of indigenous humans without any regard for permission from those 
who could be affected.77 Newly influential indigenous peoples are not only 
disturbed over existing collections, moreover, but are also angry about the 
continuing extraction of remains from burial sites (even though now much 
more closely regulated) and the resistance to returning remains to indigenous 
people for proper reburial (even though some have already been "repatri- 
ated"). Museum authorities and scientists claim that the bones (and other 
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parts) need to be examined before they can pass out of the sight and touch of 
experts. Indigenous people claim that such appeals to "science" mask ongoing 
racism and ethnocentri~m.~~ 
Religious and cultural concerns about proper respect for ancestors are cen- 
tral to indigenous peoples' claims for repatriation. "Theft" and "desecration" 
(or, at the very least, disrespect) continue for as long as the remains stay un- 
buried in collections, whether or not on display in natural history museums.79 
Native American activism, at least in the United States, has led to federal (and 
some state) statutes outlining ways to obtain human remjrins and artifacts 
from public collections. As John Winski discusses in detail, the National Mu- 
seum of the American Indian Act (NMAI, 1980) and the Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPR, 1988, 1990) are two of the 
most important pieces of recent legislation. From my perspective, it is signifi- 
cant that the NMAI requires that all of the remains held by the Smithsonian 
first be "identified and inventoried" (since many have not been studied since 
deposit). Only after that research, which may take decades, "if the tribal origin 
of such remains can be adequately determined, the affected tribe must be no- 
tified and given an opportunity to request their return."80 This act seems to 
me to reflect the spirit of the original Anatomy Act of 1832: presumably if 
remains are unidentifiable, or if the tribe they belonged to no longer survives, 
the remains have no one to suffer over them and to need their burial. In subtle 
contrast, the NAGPR extended control over the remains discovered at grave 
sites "to the lineal descendants of the deceased," or, if none exist, "to the 
Indian tribe on whose land the items are found," or, if on nontribal land, to 
"the tribe with the closest cultural affiliation to such remains."s1 This act in 
effect legislated a very broad notion of the "kin" who have an opportunity to 
care about the remains, and so to bury them. 
Conclusion 
Several legal commentators have explained how the NMAI and the NAGPR 
take steps toward dealing with the perceived difference in the way that indige- 
nous peoples' remains have been treated compared with those of identifiable 
white settlers, whose remains have regularly been reburied when disco~ered.~~ 
From this perspective, it is interesting that the apparent sensitivity shown to 
settlers' bones has not yet been extended to anatomical specimens in medical 
museums. The people from whom they came, even if now nameless, are quite 
likely linked by genetic, ethnic, and cultural heritage to the population(s) of 
the area where the specimen ~r iginated.~~ Instead of raising concern about 
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ongoing disrespect toward European, African, and Asian ancestors, however, 
relatively anonymous anatomical and pathological preparations of body parts 
somehow express (at least so far) the collective needs of humankind for prog- 
ress in medical and scientific research and teaching. Whether subliminally cat- 
egorized as "sacrifices" or "gifts" (especially by people who never actually see 
any specimens), these pieces have served appropriate goals (knowledge, better 
health care) in increasingly secular Western societies over the last century. 
As I have discussed in this essay, no one can yet claim to own an anatomical 
specimen as property, although he or she may possess it. Legal reasoning in 
Anglo-American culture has nonetheless upheld the right of "kin" to decide its 
final disposition, assuming, of course, that a still-living person did not "aban- 
don" his or her tissue in a hairbrush or in an operating suite. Without kin to 
present "a better right" to possession, once again, the parts and tissues can stay 
in the institution currently holding them. But of course these parts and tissues 
have "kin," and genetic studies could find them, given enough time and re- 
sources to do so. While DNA analysis of relatively recent human museum 
specimens is not a current intent or interest, discoveries of kin-relationships 
will likely be an inadvertent side result of historical-genetic research, which is 
rapidly expandingg4 If so, being able to give anatomical specimens a collective 
identity (tribal, ancestral, familial) could quite literally create people who just 
might care about the status, location, display, or disposal of these remains. 
Ethicists, lawyers, genetic researchers, and medical practitioners are cur- 
rently developing policies that will guide the future collection and storage of 
human tissue specimens. In these discussions, the principles of personal au- 
tonomy and informed consent loom large, reflecting their increasing signifi- 
cance in many areas of medical research and practice. With still unidentified 
materials from the past, however, the question of "informed consent," ex- 
pressing the autonomous wishes of the source person, is irrelevant. We can 
only speculate vainly about that person's possible decision, trying hard not to 
project our own assumptions and preferences onto a ghost. These ethical prin- 
ciples, moreover, will not easily solve the problems of privacy, patents, and 
potential profits on "useful" cells and genetic material collected in the present 
and future, as other essays in this collection make clear. From my historian's 
perspective, only the firm denial of commodification can possibly accommo- 
date the diverse definitions of "respect" for human beings in a pluralistic so- 
ciety. I urge that we seriously consider restricting research material to tissues 
and fluids that are the generous, unrestricted gifts of informed adults and their 
families. I would also urge that development of commercially viable products 
from these gifts be limited to corporations bound to strigent requirements to 
reinvest profits into new research, to make a proportion of products available 
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to those who cannot pay for them, and to value medical ethics above business 
practices. The gift relationship has maintained a fragile social and moral bal- 
ance between personal beliefs and medical needs in the donation of cadavers 
for dissections and in the gift of organs for transplantation; it could do so as 
well for tissue samples. 
Making adherence to these cultural values - autonomy, consent, and the 
gift relationship - more important than economic gain or research agendas 
would, of course, be extremely difficult and controversial; nor could they all 
be fulfilled to the same extent. We are too genetically intertwined to really be 
autonomous individuals anymore. My decisions about studies of my genome, 
or those of my as yet unburied ancestors, can affect not only my living rela- 
tives, but those yet to be conceived. But such has always been the case: human 
lives are too socially, economically, emotionally, and physically intertwined for 
us ever to have been really autonomous individuals, secure in our privacy and 
informed in our "free" consent. Genetic information will undoubtedly add 
more risks and fears, as well as hopes and pleasures, to how we live our lives. 
A historical perspective, nevertheless, offers many reminders that new knowl- 
edge and needs inspire cultural adaptions whose very complexities - even 
internal contradictions - in turn express multiple, conflicting values. How 
many of those our descendants end up believing in will depend not only upon 
our seemingly high ethical ideals, but also upon the mistakes we will inevitably 
make in trying to put them into practice. 
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